have been urged from any quarter. All that stands in the way of its general acceptance is the strong natural prejudice in favour of the common view of the material world, and the natural difficulty of accepting any other interpretation. Or perhaps it should be admitted that the uncertainty that attends every attempt to assign the phenomenal boundaries to the individual monad is a real difficulty ; though not a logical objection.

The tenth chapter presents very concisely Driesch's dualistic theory. I entirely agree with Driesch to the point that I insist that psycho-physical dualism be treated with respect as a possible alternative to hylozo-ism. A fashion has grown up among philosophers of dismissing dualism with a few contemptuous remarks ; a practice which plays into the hands of the mechanists. This unfortunate attitude of many philosophers is well exemplified by the following sentence from James Ward :[1] We cannot begin with theism, nor unless dualism is refuted can we ever attain to it. Naturalism, which regards matter as wholly independent of mind and mind as wholly dependent on matter, is the inevitable outcome of dualism and has ever barred the way to theism.' Ergo, dualism is barred ! This may be philosophical reasoning. It is certainly not scientific procedure. When we look for any serious refutation of dualism, we find only opprobrious epithets such as ' hopeless *impasse '.*

It is an advantage of the dualistic theory, especially

when combined with monadism, that it makes intelligible the existence of individuals or persons higher than and more comprehensive than ourselves, the wholes of which we are subordinate members, and in the lives of which we may play some part without being aware of the fact. This,